Linear Secret Sharing Schemes from Error Correcting Codes and Universal Hash Functions by Cramer, R.J.F. (Ronald) et al.
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes from Error Correcting Codes and
Universal Hash Functions
Ronald Cramer1,2, Ivan Bjerre Damg˚ard ?3, Nico Do¨ttling ?,??3, Serge Fehr1, and Gabriele Spini ? ? ?1,2,4
1 CWI Amsterdam
2 Mathematical Institute, Leiden University
3 Dept. of Computer Science, Aarhus University
4 Institut de Mathe´matiques de Bordeaux, UMR 5251, Universite´ de Bordeaux
Abstract. We present a novel method for constructing linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) from linear
error correcting codes and linear universal hash functions in a blackbox way. The main advantage of
this new construction is that the privacy property of the resulting secret sharing scheme essentially
becomes independent of the code we use, only depending on its rate. This allows us to fully harness the
algorithmic properties of recent code constructions such as efficient encoding and decoding or efficient
list-decoding. Choosing the error correcting codes and universal hash functions involved carefully, we
obtain solutions to the following open problems:
– A linear near-threshold secret sharing scheme with both linear time sharing and reconstruction
algorithms and large secrets (i.e. secrets of size Ω(n)). Thus, the computational overhead per
shared bit in this scheme is constant.
– An efficiently reconstructible robust secret sharing scheme for n/3 ≤ t < (1 − ) · n/2 corrupted
players (for any constant  > 0) with shares of optimal size O(1+λ/n) and secrets of size Ω(n+λ),
where λ is the security parameter.
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1 Introduction
Linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) are the central building block for information-theoretically secure
cryptographic primitives such as multiparty computation, robust secret sharing, as well as for two-party
primitives via the so-called MPC-in-the-head paradigm [17,19]. Naturally, the computational efficiency of
the LSSS directly influences the efficiency of the implied primitive, so it is interesting to construct schemes
where both sharing a secret and reconstruction is as efficient as possible.
It is well known that there is a natural correspondence between linear codes and LSSS [22,4,10]. Since
there is a rich body of literature about codes with efficient encoding and decoding, one might hope that
this would lead to very efficient secret sharing schemes, ideally with linear time (in the number of players)
to share and reconstruct a secret. However, for applications, one typically needs an LSSS where both the
privacy and reconstruction thresholds are constant fractions of the number of players. If we try to reach this
goal using the standard method for going from codes to LSSSs, we will need (a family of) codes where both
the code itself and its dual are (asymptotically) good codes. But unfortunately, the known codes that are
efficiently (linear time) en- and decodable have very bad dual codes. Therefore it was previously an open
problem to construct LSSSs with linear time sharing and reconstruction.
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In this paper, we suggest a new paradigm for constructing LSSSs based on linear codes and linear
universal hash functions. The main advantage of this approach is that it gives us a good privacy threshold
no matter which code we start from. We can therefore use the full power of the known constructions of linear
codes with efficient encoding and (list) decoding. We also suggest several applications of the technique.
We remark however that there is no obvious way to obtain multiplicative secret sharing schemes via our
construction paradigm. But constructions of general MPC protocols such as [6,4] require multiplicative secret
sharing schemes. Thus, we consider it an interesting open problem to extend our construction paradigm to
multiplicative secret sharing schemes.
A paradigm for building LSSS. First we note that any LSSS can be seen as being derived from a linear code
C of length n and a linear function h : Fk 7→ F`. We obtain an LSSS as follows: to share a secret s ∈ F` we
choose at random x ∈ Fk subject to h(x) = s, encode x in C, and give each entry in the resulting codeword
to a player, where in the most general case, each player may receive more than one value.
We can now say which player subsets can reconstruct the secret and which sets have no information: Let
A be a player subset and let ΠA : Fk 7→ F|A| be the linear mapping that on input x outputs the shares
given to A when x is the randomness used in the LSSS. Then A can reconstruct the secret if and only if
dim(h(ker(ΠA))) = 0, and A has no information on the secret if and only if dim(h(ker(ΠA))) = `, i.e., h is
surjective on ker(ΠA). This characterisation was first given in Theorem 10 of [4], which we have rephrased
here to match our notation (see also Lemma 3 below). It was noted already in [4] that the privacy threshold
can be estimated via the dual distance, but that this bound is not sharp. Nevertheless, previous works have
often established privacy for LSSS schemes from the dual distance. A notable exception of this is [2], where
large privacy of certain secret sharing schemes is established via a descent field technique, but the dual
distance of the corresponding code is merely constant. Thus [2] uses the characterization of [4] in its full
generality, however for a very special class of codes. As we shall see, the dual distance bound is generally
very far from being sharp, and there is great potential in avoiding the dual distance approach.
We now explain our construction of an LSSS from a code C, such that some constant fraction of the players
can reconstruct and any set smaller than some (other) constant fraction has no information. Reconstruction
is easy to handle: if we have at least r shares, then we can compute the secret if C allows decoding from
n− r erasures, and r can be Θ(n) if C is (asymptotically) good. However, it much less clear what we can say
about privacy in general (e.g., if C has a bad dual distance).
Our main idea for solving this is to notice that a player set A has partial information on x from its
shares, namely x must be in some subspace defined by the shares known to A. Now, suppose we choose h at
random from a universal family of linear hash functions. It is well known that such a random function acts
as a good randomness extractor, so we may hope that A has little or no information on h(x), at least if A
is small enough.
In the following, we show how this intuition can be formalised. It turns out that because the hash
functions are linear and the partially unknown string resides in a subspace, things are even better than what
the general theory of extractors would predict: fix any small enough corrupted set A and choose h at random
from the family. Then with very high probability, the h we have chosen will satisfy that h(x) is uniform
in the view of the adversary. We can then simply apply a union bound over all the desired privacy sets to
conclude that a random choice of h yields an LSSS with privacy threshold a constant fraction of the number
of players. For constant rate (family of) codes, this fraction can be chosen as a constant arbitrarily close to
the rate.
We emphasise that the random choice of h only needs to be done once and for all when the LSSS is set up.
Then, with overwhelming probability, the LSSS we have constructed has perfect privacy and reconstruction
as required for an LSSS. If we were willing to spend a very long (exponential) time in the set-up phase we
could verify that a candidate h indeed gives us privacy for all the desired player sets, and this way remove
the probabilistic aspect from the construction.
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1.1 Applications
Linear time LSSS Clearly, for any linear secret sharing scheme a secret can be shared using a quadratic
amount (in the number of players) of field operations. In the light of the above mentioned linear time
encodable codes, the question arises whether secret sharing schemes with a linear time sharing phase can
be constructed. Recently, Druk and Ishai [9] provided a construction of a linear time near-threshold linear
secret sharing scheme. For a near-threshold scheme, one can choose the (relative) privacy and reconstruction
thresholds as arbitrarily close constants. Their main tool for this construction is a family of linear time
encodable linear codes with good distance and good dual distance. Their construction of linear secret sharing
schemes follows Massey’s blueprint [22], i.e. exploiting the dual distance to establish privacy. The codes
constructed in [9] are not known to be linear time erasure decodable. While their construction allows to
compute shares in linear time, reconstruction is more expensive for their scheme, i.e. it requires quadratic
time with preprocessing. However more importantly, the secret space of their scheme is limited to a constant
number of bits. But this means that in their scheme the computational overhead per shared bit is linear,
rather than constant.
Following the paradigm sketched in the last paragraph, we obtain a linear time near-threshold LSSS with
secrets of size Ω(n). In particular, the computational overhead per shared bit in this scheme is constant. Just
like in the scheme of Druk and Ishai [9], we can choose the (relative) privacy and reconstruction thresholds
as arbitrarily close constants. Our construction uses the following ideas. First, we construct a linear secret
sharing scheme where sharing and reconstruction of random secrets can be performed in linear time. We do
this by plugging a linear time computable linear hash function and linear time en- and decodable code C
into our basic construction. We can then choose a random x and compute a (random) secret s = h(x) and
a share vector c by encoding x in C. Note that this can be done without having to invert the hash function
which would be too inefficient with known constructions.
We bootstrap this into a standard secret sharing scheme by the following trick. To share a given secret s,
first compute a random secret s′ together with corresponding shares c. We can now use s′ to one-time-pad
encrypt s, i.e. compute a ciphertext y = s + s′. To distribute y to the players, we disperse y, i.e. we encode
y using a linear time encodable erasure correcting code and share the codeword symbols among the players.
Note that we have effectively shared y non-privately, but this is not a problem as y is not private anyway.
Thus, the overall overhead to share the secret s is linear. To reconstruct, we can use linear time erasure
correction algorithms (provided by the codes). Therefore, both sharing and reconstruction can be performed
in linear time.
Linear time UC commitments. In a commitment scheme, a prover commits to a bit string towards a verifier
who does not learn the string at commitment time, yet the prover is committed to his choice and can
later reveal it to the verifier in a convincing way. Universally composable (UC) commitments provide the
strongest possible security for commitments schemes, guaranteeing security in any context. Until recently,
we only knew UC commitments based on expensive public-key primitives. In [8] (see also [11]), Damg˚ard
et al. propose a general scheme that constructs UC commitments with small amortised overhead from any
sufficiently good LSSS, assuming a once-and-for-all preprocessing phase where some oblivious transfers are
executed. They show how to get UC commitments with linear complexity for the verifier (linear in the size
of the string committed to), but left it as an open problem to get linear complexity also for the prover. This
problem was solved very recently by Cascudo et al. in [1] using a new construction of a non-threshold LSSS
and a new variant of the MPC-in-the-head paradigm.
Our results can be used to give an alternative and simpler solution: since the efficiency of the original
construction in [8] is inherited directly from the underlying LSSS, we immediately get linear complexity for
both parties by simply plugging in our linear time LSSS. It is also interesting to note that if our scheme can
be made multiplicative, then this and another result from [8] would immediately imply non-interactive UC
Zero-Knowledge proofs with linear complexity for both prover and verifier.
Robust secret sharing with constant size shares. A robust secret sharing scheme is a secret sharing scheme
with the additional property that reconstruction of the secret is possible (and, ideally, computationally
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feasible) even if some of the shares are incorrect. More concretely, a robust secret sharing scheme satisfies
standard t-privacy as well as robust-reconstructability, where the latter means that given all n shares, the
secret can be reconstructed even if t of them come from dishonest players and may be incorrect. In this work,
we consider robust secret sharing in the setting of a non-rushing adversary; this means that the dishonest
players have to announce their incorrect shares before getting to see the shares of the honest players.
If t < n/3 then standard error correction provides robustness for free. On the other extreme, if t ≥ n/2
then robust secret sharing is not possible. Thus, the interesting range is n/3 ≤ t < n/2. Here, robust secret
sharing is possible, but we have to allow a small error probability of 2−λ, and additional “checking data”
needs to be appended to the actual shares. The goal is to optimize the tradeoff between error probability
and the increase in share size.
Cramer, Damg˚ard and Fehr [5] gave a construction of a robust secret sharing scheme based on so-called
Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes (even though the terms robust secret sharing and AMD
codes were not used there). Roughly speaking, an AMD code enables to detect certain manipulations —
namely algebraic manipulations — of encoded messages. The robust secret sharing scheme then simply works
by sharing an AMD encoding of the secret (using a standard linear secret sharing scheme), and the robust
reconstruction is by going through all sets of possibly honest players, reconstruct from their shares, and verify
correctness of the reconstructed AMD encoding. By making the AMD codeword large enough, resulting in
an overhead in the share size of O(λ+n), this procedure finds the correct secret except with probability 2−λ.
An obvious downside of this scheme is that the robust reconstruction procedure is not efficient, as there is
an exponential number of sets of possibly honest players to be considered.
In [3], based on very different techniques, Cevallos, Fehr, Ostrovsky and Rabani proposed a robust secret
sharing scheme, with similar parameters: overhead O(λ+ n log n) for an error probability of 2−λ, but which
offers an efficient robust reconstruction. Both these schemes work for any fraction t/n < 12 , and neither
becomes significantly better in terms of this error probability versus the size of the checking data if we
bound t/n away from 12 by a small constant.
Based on our new paradigm for building LSSSs, we construct a new robust secret sharing scheme. Our
construction works when t/n is bounded away from 12 by an arbitrary small positive constant. In this regime,
we can consider ramp schemes, for which there is a gap between the privacy threshold t and the standard
reconstruction threshold r, while still allowing for robust reconstruction in the presence of t faulty shares.
In ramp schemes, the (actual) shares may be smaller than the secret (by a factor r− t). In our construction,
we can additionally reduce the size of the checking data per share; this is in contrast to the above mentioned
constructions when generalized to ramp schemes where the size of the checking data stays O(λ).
Our construction can be seen as an efficient variant of the approach from [5]. We will secret share an
AMD codeword, but this time using our construction of LSSS from above and choosing the underlying code
C to be one that allows efficient list decoding. This means that we can consider the contributed shares as a
codeword with errors and apply the list decoding algorithm. This will return a small (i.e., polynomial size)
list of possible code words from C, each of these will suggest a possible AMD codeword. Thus, we only have a
small number of candidates to check for correctness of the AMD encoding. This not only provides efficiency
of the reconstruction (in contrast to the scheme of [5]), but also allows better parameters: using a highly
list-decodable code as underlying code in our construction, we obtain that for every constant τ < 12 there
exists a robust secret sharing scheme for threshold t = τn that supports secrets of size linear in n + λ and
has shares of size O(1 + λ/n), i.e. the size of the shares actually decreases in n.
2 Preliminaries
We will assume basic concepts from linear algebra such as linear maps and their kernels. For any prime
power q, we will denote the finite field with q elements by Fq. We will denote vectors x with boldface letters.
We will also consider vectors whose components are vectors, e.g. a vector x ∈ (Fmq )n whose components are
Fmq vectors. For a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} we will use ΠA : (Fmq )n → (Fmq )|A| to denote the projection onto the
components in A. For a vector x ∈ (Fmq )n and a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} we will also use the notation xA = ΠA(x).
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2.1 Probability
The binary entropy function H : [0, 1/2] → [0, 1] is given by H(0) := 0 and H(x) := −x · log(x) − (1 − x) ·
log(1− x) for x ∈ (0, 1/2]. For 0 ≤ t/n ≤ 1/2 we can upper bound binomial coefficients by (nt) ≤ 2H(t/n)·n,
for a proof see e.g. [23]. We will also use the Markov inequality (see also [23]).
Lemma 1 (Markov Inequality). Let X be a non-negative random variable defined on R for which E[X]
exists. Then it holds for every x > 0 that
Pr[X ≥ x] ≤ E[X]
x
.
Corollary 1. Let X be a random variable with finite support X ⊆ R which assumes its minimum at x0 and
its second smallest value at x1 > x0. Then it holds that
E[X] ≥ x0 + (x1 − x0) · Pr[X 6= x0].
Proof. The expectation E[X] exists as X has a finite support. Since X assumes its minimum at x0 it holds
that X − x0 is non-negative. By the Markov inequality it holds that
Pr[X 6= x0] = Pr[X ≥ x1] = Pr[X − x0 ≥ x1 − x0] ≤ E[X]− x0
x1 − x0 ,
as E[X − x0] = E[X]− x0 by linearity of expectation. Thus the claim follows.
2.2 Universal Hashing
Universal hash functions are a central tool in information-theoretically secure cryptography.
Definition 1 (Universal Hash Functions). Let X and Y be finite sets. A family H of functions X → Y
is called family of universal hash functions if it holds for all distinct x, x′ ∈ X that
Pr
H←$H
[H(x) = H(x′)] ≤ 1|Y| ,
where H is chosen uniformly from H.
For families H of Fq-linear functions, meaning that both X and Y are Fq-vector spaces and each h ∈ H is a
Fq-linear function, the condition of Definition 1 can be rephrased as follows: H is a family of universal hash
functions if and only if for all x ∈ X \ {0}
Pr
H←$H
[H(x) = 0] ≤ 1|Y| .
We then naturally refer to H as a family of Fq-linear universal hash functions.
There are various efficient families of linear universal hash functions, such random matrices or random
Toeplitz matrices (see e.g. [21]). Ishai et al. [17] constructed a linear time computable family of linear universal
hash functions, c.f. Section 5.
2.3 Error Correcting Codes
We assume basic concepts from coding theory. Error correcting codes are used to encode messages in such
a way that the encoding is resilient against certain types of errors. Formally, a Fq-linear error correcting
code C of length n and dimension k is a k-dimensional subspace of Fnq . We say that C is an m−folded code,
if C is a k-dimensional subspace of (Fmq )n. This basically means that the alphabet of C is Fmq rather than
Fq. An m-folded code C of length n can be naturally interpreted as a code of length m · n. In this view,
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the possible error patterns in a folded code are burst errors rather than symbol errors. The rate R of an
m-folded [n, k] code is defined by R = kmn , i.e. 1/R is the factor by which the code expands messages. We
will denote distinguished encoding and decoding algorithms5 for a linear code C by C.Encode and C.Decode.
We will denote the (generalized) Hamming distance for vectors x,y ∈ (Fmq )n by d(x,y) = |{i | xi 6= yi}|,
i.e. d(x,y) counts in how many blocks xi,yi ∈ Fmq the vectors x and y differ.
2.4 Secret Sharing Schemes
A secret sharing scheme allows a dealer to distribute a secret to n players in such a way that the players of
any large enough set of players can jointly reconstruct the secret from their shares, whereas small coalitions of
players have no information on the secret. A secret sharing scheme is called linear, if any linear combination
of valid share vectors results in a valid share vector of the linear combination applied to the respective secrets.
This is summarized in the following definition.
Definition 2. Let Fq be a finite field, and let l, m and t < r ≤ n be positive integers. A linear secret
sharing scheme LSSS consists of two algorithms LSSS.Share(·) and LSSS.Reconstruct(·). For every s ∈ Flq,
LSSS.Share(s) outputs a vector of shares c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ (Fmq )n. We require the following three properties.
– t-privacy: for all s, s′ ∈ Flq and every A ∈ {1, . . . , n} of size |A| = t, the restrictions cA and c′A of
c = LSSS.Share(s) and c′ = LSSS.Share(s′) to the coordinates in A have the same probability distribution.
– r-reconstructability: for every s ∈ Flq and every Q ∈ {1, . . . , n} of size |Q| = r, it holds for c =
LSSS.Share(s) that LSSS.Reconstruct(c˜) = s, where c˜ is a vector with c˜Q = cQ and c˜Q¯ only contains
erasure symbols, i.e. c˜Q¯ = ⊥|Q¯|.
– Linearity: If c1 and c2 are respective sharings of s1 and s2, then αc1 + βc2 is a sharing of αs1 + βs2.
We emphasize that we do not require r = t+ 1; secret sharing schemes with r > t+ 1 are sometimes referred
to as ramp schemes. We may use this terminology sometimes to emphasize that we allow r > t + 1. For
schemes with r = t+ 1, it is well known that the size of the secret cannot be bigger than the size of a share,
i.e., l ≤ m. For a ramp schemes, this generalizes to l ≤ (r− t) ·m. The rate of a secret sharing scheme is given
by ρ = lmn . Using this terminology, the above can be expressed as follows. For any n-player ramp scheme
that satisfies τn-privacy and σn-reconstructability, the rate of the scheme can be at most ρ ≤ σ − τ .
3 Subspace Surjectivity of Linear Universal Hash Functions
In this section, we provide a general theorem about universal hash functions. The theorem states that if
we fix an r-dimensional subspace V of Fkq , then a randomly chosen linear universal hash function H from a
family which maps Fkq to Flq is surjective on V , except with probability q−(r−l). By saying that H is surjective
on V , we mean that H(V ) = Flq.
This theorem can be interpreted in information theoretic terms. We can identify a subspace V with the
uniform distribution v on V and consider v as a linear source of randomness. Since V has dimension l, the
q-ary min-entropy of v is at least l. From this point of view, the theorem states that universal hash functions
are good extractors for linear sources, i.e. they extract such sources perfectly, except with probability q−(r−l).
Perfect extraction in this context means that H(v) is exactly the uniform distribution. The leftover hash
lemma [16] states that universal hash functions yield good extractors for sources with a sufficient amount of
min-entropy. We can actually establish a weaker version of this theorem based on the leftover hash lemma.
However, the parameters obtained by our theorem are tighter than parameters obtainable by the leftover
hash lemma. The best probability of failure obtainable via the leftover hash lemma is q−(r−l)/2, which is
worse than the bound given in the theorem.
5 such as linear time algorithms for these tasks
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Theorem 1. Let H be a family of linear universal hash functions Fkq → Flq. Further let V be a subspace of
Fkq of dimension at least r. Let H ←$ H be chosen uniformly at random and then fixed. Then it holds that
H(V ) = Flq (i.e. H is surjective on V ), except with probability q−(r−l) over the choice of H.
Proof. For any linear function h ∈ H, it holds that h(V ) = Flq if and only if dim(V ∩ ker(h)) = dim(V ) − l,
which is equivalent to |V ∩ ker(h)| = |V |
ql
. Now, let H←$ H and define the random variable X = |V ∩ ker(H)|
(depending on H). By the above it holds that H is surjective on V if and only if X = |V |/ql. For each v ∈ V ,
define the random variable
Xv =
{
1 if H(v) = 0
0 otherwise
Clearly, it holds that X =
∑
v∈V Xv. Since X0 = 1, we have that X = 1 +
∑
v∈V \{0}Xv. Moreover, X
assumes its minimum at x0 =
|V |
ql
and its second smallest value at x1 =
|V |
ql−1 . We will now compute the
expectation of X. For each v ∈ V \{0} it holds that
E[Xv] = Pr
H←$H
[H(v) = 0] ≤ q−l,
as H is a family of universal hash functions. By linearity of expectation, it holds that
E[X] = 1 +
∑
v∈V \{0}
E[Xv] = 1 +
|V | − 1
ql
.
By Corollary 1 and the fact that |V | ≥ qr it holds that
Pr
[
X 6= |V |
ql
]
≤
1 + |V |−1
ql
− |V |
ql
|V |
ql−1 − |V |ql
=
ql − 1
|V | · (q − 1)
≤ q
l
|V | ≤ q
−(r−l).
Consequently, it holds that H(V ) = Flq, except with probability q−(k−l).
Given a collection V of at most r-dimensional subspaces of Fk, taking a union bound over all V ∈ V and
applying Theorem 1 yields that it holds for all V ∈ V that H(V ) = Flq, except with probability |V| · q−(r−l).
This is summarized in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Let H be a family of linear universal hash functions Fkq → Flq and V be a collection of subspaces
of Fkq , each of dimension at least r. Let H←$ H be chosen uniformly at random and then fixed. Then it holds
for all V ∈ V that H(V ) = Flq (i.e. H is surjective on V ), except with probability |V| · q−(r−l) over the choice
of H.
4 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes from Codes and Universal Hash Functions
In this section, we will provide our basic LSSS construction. In the following sections, we will provide
applications based on this scheme. The scheme LSSSC,h is defined by an m-folded Fq-linear code C and an
Fq-linear surjective function h. A secret s is shared by first sampling a random preimage x of s under the
function h, and then encoding x using the (folded) code C, obtaining a share vector c ∈ (Fmq )n. Each share ci
is a vector in Fmq . Notice that we can efficienly sample a preimage x of s under the function h by using basic
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linear algebra, since the function h is linear. More specifically, we can sample such an x by first computing
any preimage x1 of s and then randomize x1 by adding a uniformly random x2 ←$ ker(h) to x1, i.e. setting
x← x1 + x2. Though this sharing algorithm Share is efficient, it still involves a rather costly inversion of h,
which has overhead O(n3) when implemented naively. Thus, even if both h and C.Encode can be computed
super-efficiently (e.g. in linear time), Share does not achieve the same efficiency.
In order to take full advantage of super-efficient h and C.Encode, we will provide an alternative sharing
algorithm ShareRandom which computes both h and ShareRandom only in forward direction. Thus, if both
h and C.Encode are super-efficient, then so is ShareRandom. However, ShareRandom only generates shares
for randomly chosen secrets. In Section 5 we show how a secret sharing scheme with super-efficient random
sharing algorithm can be bootstrapped into a secret sharing scheme with super-efficient standard sharing
algorithm Share. We will now provide our construction.
Construction 1 Let C be an m-folded Fq-linear [n, k] code with encoding and decoding procedures C.Encode
and C.Decode and let h : Fkq → Flq be a surjective Fq-linear function. The secret sharing scheme LSSSC,h is
given by the following sharing and reconstruction procedures.
Share(s):
x←$ h−1(s)
c← C.Encode(x)
Output share vector c
Reconstruct(c˜):
x← C.Decode(c˜)
If x = ⊥
Output ⊥
s← h(x)
Output s
ShareRandom():
x←$ Fkq
c← C.Encode(x)
s← h(x)
Output secret s
and share vector c
First observe that the linearity of LSSSC,h follows straightforwardly from the linearity of the code C and
the function h. Moreover, all reconstruction properties of LSSSC,h follow from corresponding properties of
the code C.
Lemma 2. Let C be an m-folded Fq-linear [n, k] code and h : Fkq → Flq be a surjective Fq-linear function.
Secrets are elements of Flq, whereas (single) shares are elements of Fmq . Assume that C.Decode can correct n−r
erasures. Then LSSSC,h is an n-player LSSS which fulfills the linearity and r-reconstructability properties.
Moreover, ShareRandom implements the same functionality as choosing s at random, computing c← Share(s)
and outputting (s, c).
Proof. First notice that since h is surjective, the sharing algorithm Share can compute a share vector c
for every message s ∈ Flq. The Fq-linearity property follows directly from the Fq-linearity if C and h. If r
shares are given, we can assemble a vector c˜ that has at most n− r erasures. Consequently, C.Decode(c˜) will
recover the correct x and we can compute the secret s = h(x). To see that ShareRandom computes the same
functionality as choosing s uniformly at random and computing c ← Share(s), notice that the x computed
by Share(s) can be written as x = x1 +x2, where x1 is a vector uniquely determined by s in an l-dimensional
subspace W of Fkq with h(W ) = Flq and x2 is chosen uniformly at random from ker(h). Thus if s is chosen
uniformly at random, then x is also distributed uniformly at random in Fkq , just as the x computed by
ShareRandom(). The claim follows.
We will now determine under which conditions LSSSC,h fulfills the privacy property. In the first step, we
first derive a general condition on the function h which is actually a necessary and sufficient requirement. In
the second step, we will show that this requirement is met with overwhelming probability when the function
h is chosen randomly from a family of universal hash functions. To simplify the analysis, we will identify
the linear function h : Fkq → Flq with another linear function Φ : C → Flq. This is always possible as C is
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a k-dimensional Fq-vectorspace and thus isomorphic to Fkq . In fact, we can basically define the function Φ
by Φ(c) = h(C.Decode(c)) for all c ∈ C. We will denote projections of shares to a subset A of players by
ΠA : C→ (Fmq )|A|.
Lemma 3. A set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} has privacy if and only if Φ(ker(ΠA)) = Flq, where ker(ΠA) = {x ∈
C | ΠA(x) = 0}.
Proof. First assume that Φ(ker(ΠA)) = Flq. Fix a subspaceW ⊆ ker(ΠA) of dimension l such that Φ(W ) = Flq.
As W ∩ ker(Φ) = {0}, it holds that C = W ⊕ ker(Φ), i.e. we can write every c ∈ C as c = cs + cr, for unique
cs ∈W and cr ∈ ker(Φ). Now, let c = Share(s). As c ∈ C, we can write c as
c = cs + cr,
where cs ∈ W is a unique vector such that Φ(cs) = s and cr is chosen uniformly at random from ker(Φ).
Now, it holds that
ΠA(c) = ΠA(cs + cr) = ΠA(cs) +ΠA(cr) = ΠA(cr),
as cs ∈ W ⊆ ker(ΠA). Thus, ΠA(c) = ΠA(cr) is distributed independently of s and we can conclude that
privacy holds.
For the converse direction, assume that Φ(ker(ΠA)) $ Flq, i.e. there exists an s∗ ∈ Flq\Φ(ker(ΠA)). We
will now show that if c = Share(0) and c∗ = Share(s∗), then the projections ΠA(c) and ΠA(c∗) can always
be distinguished. We claim that ΠA(c
∗) /∈ ΠA(ker(Φ)). To see this, assume towards contradiction that
ΠA(c
∗) ∈ ΠA(ker(Φ)). Then there exists a h ∈ ker(Φ) such that ΠA(c∗) = ΠA(h). Since ΠA is linear, it
holds that ΠA(c
∗ − h) = 0 and consequently c∗ − h ∈ ker(ΠA). From this, however follows
Φ(c∗) = Φ(c∗ − h) ∈ Φ(ker(ΠA)),
as h ∈ ker(Φ). This however contradicts s∗ = Φ(c∗) /∈ Φ(ker(ΠA)) and we conclude that it must hold
that ΠA(c
∗) /∈ ΠA(ker(Φ)). Finally, notice that c ∈ ker(Φ) as c = Share(0). Thus it holds that ΠA(c) ∈
ΠA(ker(Φ)). We can therefore easily (and perfectly) distinguish ΠA(c) from ΠA(c
∗) by checking whether it
is in ΠA(ker(Φ)). This contradicts the privacy property and we can conclude the proof.
We will now use the characterization of Lemma 3 and Corollary 2 to show that if we instantiate h with
a randomly chosen linear universal hash function, then we obtain a good linear secret sharing scheme.
Lemma 4. Let C be a m-folded Fq-linear [n, k] code and let H be a family of Fq-linear universal hash
functions Fkq → Flq. Let R = kmn be the rate of C, let ρ = lnm and let τ > 0 and η > 0 be constants. Given
that R ≥ ρ+η+τ+H(τ)/(m · log(q)), then there exists a h ∈ H such that LSSSC,h has τn-privacy. Moreover,
such a function h can be chosen randomly with success-probability 1− q−ηnm.
Proof. Let Ψ : C → Fkq be the isomorphism that corresponds to the function C.Decode(·). For each set
A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size at most t = τn, it holds that ker(ΠA) ⊆ C is a subspace of dimension at least k−mt,
as C has dimension k and the image of ΠA has dimension at most mt. Thus, Ψ(ker(ΠA)) ⊆ Fkq also has
dimension at least k−mt, as Ψ is an isomorphism. Consequently V = {Ψ(ker(ΠA)) | A ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |A| = t}
is a collection of subspaces of dimension at least k−mt. Moreover, as A is taken over all subsets of {1, . . . , n}
of size t, it holds that
|V| ≤
(
n
t
)
≤ 2H(t/n)·n = 2H(τ)·n = q H(τ)m log(q) ·mn.
By Lemma 3, LSSSC,h has privacy for all A with |A| ≤ t if it holds h(V ) = Flq for each V ∈ V. By Corollary
2, it holds for all V ∈ V that H(V ) = Flq, except with probability
|V| · q−(k−mt−l) ≤ q−(k−mt−l− H(τ)m log(q) ·mn) = q−(R−ρ−τ− H(τ)m log(q) )·mn ≤ q−ηmn,
over the choice of H←$ H, as R ≥ ρ+ η + τ +H(τ)/(m · log(q)). Thus, LSSSC,H has t-privacy, except with
probability q−ηmn over the choice of H←$ H. This concludes the proof.
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Remark 1. It can be seen rather easily that the function H in Lemma 4 must either be chosen randomly or
depending on the code C, i.e. for any fixed function h we can find a code C∗ such that LSSSC∗,h does not
provide any privacy. Thus, to obtain a construction that is oblivious of the specific code we use, randomization
is strictly necessary.
5 Linear Time Sharing and Reconstruction
As our first application, we will show how to construct a linear secret sharing scheme with linear time sharing
and reconstruction phase. Choosing a linear time encodable code C and a linear time computable function
h yields that the sharing procedure ShareRandom of Construction 1 is also linear time computable. This is,
in turn, not true for the sharing procedure Share of Construction 1. We circumvent this issue by providing
a sharing algorithm that first computes shares of a random secret s′ using ShareRandom, then uses s′ to
one-time-pad encrypt the actual secret s. The ciphertext s + s′ is then distributed by applying a standard
information dispersal technique, i.e. we encode s + s′ using an erasure correcting code and append the
codeword symbols to the shares. This basically results in a doubling of the share size. This technique bears
resemblance to the construction of Krawczyk [20]. However, while in [20] information dispersal is applied to
reduce the share size (using a computationally secure encryption scheme), we use this technique to salvage
the linear time computability of the (non-random) sharing algorithm.
We will start by providing an instantiation of Construction 1 with linear time random sharing and
reconstruction algorithms. Moreover, the scheme we provide will be near -threshold. We need both a family
of linear time computable universal hash functions and linear time en- and decodable codes. Ishai et al. [18]
construct a family of F2-linear universal hash functions which can be computed in linear time. This result
has recently been generalized by Druk and Ishai [9] to any finite field, but the binary case of [18] is sufficient
for our application.
Theorem 2 (Ishai et al. [18]). For every l < k, there exists a family F2-linear universal hash functions
H mapping Fk2 to Fl2 which can be computed in time linear in k.
There is a large corpus of work dealing with linear time encodable codes, starting with the seminal work
of Spielman [25]. To the best of our knowledge, the currently best known parameters can be obtained using
a family of codes by Guruswami and Indyk [12].
Theorem 3 (Guruswami-Indyk [12]). For every rate R and every sufficiently small  (depending on R)
there exists an infinite family of m-folded F2-linear codes {Cn} of rate R, where m = O
(
log(1/)
4R
)
, such that
the codes from the family can be encoded in linear time and also decoded in linear time from an 1 − R − 
fraction of erasures.
We will now instantiate the the linear secret sharing scheme LSSSC,h of Construction 1 with the codes from
Theorem 3 and universal hash functions from Theorem 2.
Lemma 5. For all constants 0 < τ < σ < 1 and every rate ρ < σ − τ there exists an infinite family of F2-
linear secret schemes {LSSS1n} with τn-privacy, σn-reconstructability and rate ρ. The shares of LSSS1n have
size m bits, where m > 0 is a constant. Furthermore, LSSS1n.ShareRandom and LSSS
1
n.Reconstruct can be
computed in linear time. Moreover, such a scheme LSSS1n can be constructed randomly with success-probability
1− 2−ηmn (for some constant η > 0 depending on τ , σ and ρ).
Proof. We will instantiate the linear secret sharing scheme LSSSC,h from Construction 1 with a linear code
Cn from the family {Cn} of F2-linear codes from Theorem 3 and a function h from the family H of F2-linear
universal hash functions from Theorem 2. We now show how to choose the parameters for this instantiation.
By Lemma 4, in order to obtain a secret sharing scheme with τn privacy, we need to select an m-folded
code Cn from the above family of length n and rate R such that R ≥ ρ+ η + τ +H(τ)/m for an arbitrarily
small constant η. Moreover, as by Lemma 2 we ne need to be able to correct a 1− σ fraction of erasures to
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have σn reconstruction, we need to choose Cn such that 1 − σ ≤ 1 − R − , equivalently R ≤ σ − . Both
constraints together yield
σ − τ − ρ ≥ + η + H(τ)
m
. (1)
Since σ > τ and σ − τ > ρ, the left hand side of Inequality 1 is a constant greater than 0. It is clear
from Theorem 3 that we can choose the folding parameter m as an arbitrarily large constant, thereby also
decreasing . Consequently, the terms  and H(τ)m become arbitrarily small and we can choose a sufficiently
small η > 0 such that the inequality is satisfied. Setting R = σ− we found admissible constants R,m, η,  > 0
such that R ≥ ρ + η + τ + H(τ)/m. Now let Cn be a code of length n from the above family that matches
these constants. By Theorem 3 such a code exists for all constants R,m,  > 0. Now let H be a the family
of universal hash functions from 2 mapping FRmn2 to F
ρmn
2 obtained by Theorem 2. By Lemma 4, choosing
the universal hash function H randomly from H yields that LSSSC,H has τ privacy, except with probability
2−ηmn.
Notice that the computational overhead per shared bit in LSSS1n is constant for ShareRandom. We will
now bootstrap the scheme LSSS1n given by Lemma 5 into a secret sharing scheme with linear time sharing
and reconstruction algorithms.
Construction 2 Let C′ be a (folded) Fq-linear [n, l] code with encoding and decoding procedures C′.Encode
and C′.Decode and let LSSS1 be a Fq-linear secret sharing scheme with a sharing procedure LSSS1.ShareRandom()
for random secrets. The secret sharing scheme LSSS2 is given by the following sharing and reconstruction
procedures.
Share(s):
(s′, c)← LSSS1.ShareRandom()
d← C′.Encode(s′ + s)
Parse c = (c1, . . . , cn)
and d = (d1, . . . ,dn)
Output z = ((c1,d1), . . . , (cn,dn))
Reconstruct(z˜):
Parse z˜ = ((c˜1, d˜1), . . . , (c˜n, d˜n))
c˜← (c˜1, . . . , c˜n)
d˜← (d˜1, . . . , d˜n)
s′ ← LSSS1.Reconstruct(c˜)
y← C′.Decode(d˜)
If s′ = ⊥ or y = ⊥
Output ⊥
Otherwise
Output y − s′
Lemma 6. Assume that LSSS1 provides t-privacy and r-reconstructability, and LSSS1.ShareRandom is linear
time computable. Assume further that C′ is linear time encodable and that C′.Decode can decode from r-
erasures. Then LSSS2 also has t-privacy and r-reconstructability and LSSS2.Share is linear time computable.
Furthermore, if both LSSS1.Reconstruct and C′.Decode are linear time computable, then LSSS2.Reconstruct
is also linear time computable.
Proof. Linear time computability of LSSS2.Share and LSSS2.Reconstruct follows straightforwardly from the
linear time computability of LSSS1.ShareRandom and C′.Encode as well as LSSS1.Reconstruct and C′.Decode
respectively.
To see that LSSS2 has r-reconstructability, observe that LSSS1.Reconstruct(c˜) recovers s′ from t as long
as c˜ contains at most r erasures. Likewise, C′.Decode(d˜) recovers x = s + s′ from d˜ as long as d˜ contains at
most r erasures. r-reconstructability of LSSS2 follows.
To see that LSSS2 has t-privacy, let z = ((c1,d1), . . . , (cn,dn)) be a vector of shares generated by
LSSS2.Share(s). For any A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size at most t, it holds by the t-privacy of LSSS1 that s′ is
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distributed uniformly at random given the shares cA. Thus, the (cA, s + s
′) is distributed independently of
s. But the same holds for (cA,dA), as dA can be computed from s + s
′. Consequently, t-privacy of LSSS2
follows.
Finally, plugging the linear secret sharing scheme LSSS1n obtained in Lemma 5 into Construction 2, we
obtain the main result for this section. For the sake of simplicity, as code C′ in Construction 2 we can choose
the same code C as in Lemma 5 and match its rate to the rate of LSSS1n. We conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For all constants 0 < τ < σ < 1 and every rate ρ < σ − τ there exists an infinite family
of F2-linear secret scheme {LSSS2n} with τn-privacy, σn-reconstructability and rate ρ. The shares of LSSS2n
have size m, where m > 0 is a constant. LSSS2n.Share and LSSS
2
n.Reconstruct can be computed in linear time.
Moreover, such a scheme LSSS2n can be constructed randomly with success-probability 1 − 2−ηmn (for some
constant η > 0 depending on τ , σ and ρ).
6 Robust Secret Sharing with Constant Size Shares
In this section, we show how our generic construction of LSSSs from codes gives rise to new robust secret
sharing schemes, i.e., to schemes where the secret can be correctly reconstructed even if some of the shares
provided are incorrect.
The idea behind our new scheme is to instantiate Construction 1 with a highly list-decodable code C.
When confronted with the task of reconstructing the secret in the presence of faulty shares, this allows us
to narrow down the list of candidate secrets to a small set. To single out the right secret, we will precode
it using an AMD code, as introduced in [7]. Informally, an AMD code is a (key-less) code that is resilient
towards certain — namely algebraic — manipulations.
This construction is similar to the construction of Cramer, Damg˚ard and Fehr [5]. However, the fact that
our construction allows us to use a list-decodable code (whereas [5] uses standard Shamir secret sharing [24])
makes our scheme computationally efficient, in contrast to the robust reconstruction procedure of [5], which
involves a brute-force search over all subsets of size t. Furthermore, in the regime we consider, namely when
t/n is bounded away from 12 , we get better parameters than previous work.
6.1 Formal Definitions and Building Blocks
We start by formalizing the notion of a robust secret sharing scheme.
Definition 3. A linear secret sharing scheme LSSS is (t, δ)-robust if there exists an additional algorithm
LSSS.RobustReconstruct with the property that for every secret s and for every subset A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size
|A| = t, the following holds. If c = LSSS.Share(s), and c˜ is such that c˜A¯ = cA¯ and c˜A only depends on cA,
then LSSS.RobustReconstruct(c˜) = s except with probability δ.
In the range n/3 ≤ t < n/2, robust secret sharing is only possible if we allow a non-zero error probability
δ, and we append some additional “checking data” to the actual shares. The goal is to optimize the trade-
off between this overhead in the share size and δ. As outlined above, our construction is based on using a
list-decodable code in our general construction of LSSS from codes.
Definition 4. An m-folded Fq-linear [n, k] code C is said to be (t, `)-list decodable if there exists an efficient
algorithm C.ListDecode such that for any codeword c ∈ C and any error pattern e ∈ (Fmq )n of weight at most
t, C.ListDecode(c + e) produces a list of all elements x ∈ Fkq with d(C.Encode(x), c + e) ≤ t. Furthermore,
the size of the list is at most `.
We will now state two results for highly list-decodable codes. The first one is due to Guruswami and
Rudra [13] as well as Guruswami and Wang [14] and states that m-folded Reed Solomon codes are highly
list-decodable. The second result, due to Guruswami and Xing [15], states that certain m-folded algebraic
geometric codes are highly list-decodable.
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Theorem 5 (List-decodability of Folded Reed Solomon Codes [13,14]). For any rate 0 < R < 1
and  > 0, any large enough integer m > 0 (depending on R and ) and for any integer n > 0 there exist
a prime power q = q(n) = O(n) and an m-folded Fq-linear code C of length n and rate R, such that C is
efficiently (τn, `)-list decodable with τ = 1−R−  and ` = poly(n). The list decoder has runtime poly(n,m).
Theorem 6 (List-decodability of Folded Algebraic Geometric Codes [15]). For any rate 0 < R < 1
and  > 0, and for any large enough integer m > 0 (depending on R and ) there exist a constant prime
power q and an infinite family of m-folded Fq-linear codes {Cn}, such that the rate of Cn is R, and Cn is
efficiently (τn, `)-list decodable with τ = 1−R−  and ` = poly(n). The list decoder has runtime poly(n,m).
Notice that in both constructions the runtime of the list decoder is polynomial in both the code length n
and the folding parameter m. This means that we can choose the folding parameter super constant and still
have efficient list decodability. Additionally, we make use of AMD codes (restricting ourselves to Fq-linear
spaces for simplicity).
Definition 5 (Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes [7]). Let q be a prime-power, l > k be integers
and δ > 0. A (qk, ql, δ)-AMD code AMD consists of a probabilistic encoding algorithm AMD.Encode : Fkq → Flq
and a (deterministic) decoding algorithm AMD.Decode : Flq → Fkq unionsq {⊥}, such that the following holds for
every x ∈ Flq.
– Correctness: AMD.Decode(AMD.Encode(x)) = x with probability 1.
– Manipulation detection: for every offset ∆ ∈ Flq, and for c generated as c ← AMD.Encode(x), it holds
that AMD.Decode(c + ∆) ∈ {⊥,x} except with probability at most δ.
A simple example AMD code is given by AMD.Encode : Fkq → Fkq × Fkq × Fkq , s 7→ (s, r, sr), where r is
uniformly random from Fkq , and the multiplication sr is given by fixing an isomorphism of Fq-vector spaces
Fkq → Fqk , and with the obvious decoding: checking the multiplicative relation. It is not hard to show that
this AMD code has error probability δ = q−k. In our construction, we use a slightly more sophisticated AMD
code, due to [7], given by
AMD.Encode : Fdq → Fdq × Fq × Fq, s 7→
(
s, r, rd+2 +
d∑
i=1
sir
i
)
where r is uniformly random from Fkq , char(Fq) - d + 2, and with the obvious decoding. This construction
gives rise to the following claim.
Lemma 7 ([7]). For any prime power q and integers l > 2κ > 0, there exists a
(
ql−2κ, ql, (l− 2κ+ 1)/qκ)-
AMD code.
6.2 The Construction
In order to have a modular exposition, we first introduce the notion of a list reconstructible secret sharing
scheme. In a nutshell, list reconstructible secret sharing is a weak version of robust secret sharing. Instead of
requiring reconstruction of the correct secret (in the presence of faulty shares), we merely require reconstruc-
tion of a short list of possible candidates of which one is the correct secret. In addition to that, we require
some linearity property.
Definition 6. We say that a linear secret sharing scheme LSSS is (t, `)-list reconstructible, if there exists
an efficient algorithm LSSS.ListReconstruct(), such that for all e of weight at most t, the following holds.
LSSS.ListReconstruct(e) outputs a list of length ` containing 0, and for any secret s and its share vector c
we have
LSSS.ListReconstruct(c + e) = s + LSSS.ListReconstruct(e)
= {s + w | w ∈ LSSS.ListReconstruct(e)},
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We now show that, not very surprisingly, using a list-decodable code in Construction 1 results in a list
reconstructable secret sharing scheme.
Lemma 8. Let C be an m-folded Fq-linear [n, k] code and h : Fkq → Flq an Fq-linear function, and let LSSSC,h
be the linear secret sharing scheme resulting from Construction 1. If C is (t, `)-list-decodable then LSSSC,h is
(t, `)-list reconstructible.
Proof. ListReconstruct simply works by running C.ListDecode and applying h to all the elements in the list
output by C.ListDecode. In order to show that Definition 6 is satisfied, due to the linearity of h it is sufficient
to show that
C.ListDecode(c + e) = m + C.ListDecode(e) ,
for any m ∈ Fkq , c = C.Encode(m), and any error vector e of weight at most t.
First of all, the bound on the size of the list, and that it contains 0, are obvious. For any w ∈
C.ListDecode(e), we have that d(C.Encode(w), e) ≤ t. By linearity, it holds that
C.Encode(m + w) = c + C.Encode(w).
Therefore,
C.Encode(m + w)− (c + e) = C.Encode(w)− e
from which follows that
d(C.Encode(m + w), c + e) = d(C.Encode(w), e) ≤ t,
i.e. m + w ∈ C.ListDecode(c + e). Similarly, for any w ∈ C.ListDecode(c + e), we have that
C.Encode(w −m) = C.Encode(w)− c,
and consequently
e− C.Encode(w −m) = (c + e)− C.Encode(w).
This proves that the two lists, C.ListDecode(c + e) and m + C.ListDecode(e), contain exactly the same
elements, which was to be proven.
Instantiating the above with the list decodable codes from Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 respectively yields
the following Lemma.
Lemma 9. For any τ < 12 , any τ < σ < 1− τ , any ρ < σ− τ and any sufficiently large m > 0 we have that:
– For every integer n > 0 there exists a q = O(n) and an n-player Fq-linear secret sharing scheme LSSSn
with τn-privacy, σn-reconstruction and (τn, poly(n))-list reconstruction. Furthermore, the rate of LSSSn
is ρ and the shares of LSSSn are elements of Fmq . The list reconstruction algorithm has runtime poly(n,m).
– There exists a constant prime power q and an infinite family of Fq-linear secret sharing schemes {LSSSn},
such that LSSSn is an n-player scheme with τn-privacy, σn-reconstruction and (τn, poly(n))-list recon-
struction. Furthermore, the rate of LSSSn is ρ and the shares of LSSSn are elements of Fmq . The list
reconstruction algorithm has runtime poly(n,m).
Proof. We will instantiate the scheme LSSSC,h from Construction 1 enhanced to a list-reconstructible scheme
by Lemma 8 with either the codes from Theorem 5 or Theorem 6 respectively and a suitable family H of
universal hash functions.
By Lemma 4, in order to obtain a secret sharing scheme with τn privacy and rate ρ, we need to select
an m-folded code C from one of the above families with rate R such that
R ≥ ρ+ η + τ + H(τ)
m log(q)
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for an arbitrarily small constant η. To get list reconstructability, we need to be able to list-decode a τ fraction
of errors. Thus, we need to choose the constants R and  for the above families such that τ ≤ 1 − R − ,
which is equivalent to R ≤ 1− τ − . Together, these two constraints yield a new constraint
1− 2τ − ρ ≥ + η + H(τ)
m log(q)
. (2)
The left-hand side of Inequality 2 is a constant greater than 0, as ρ < σ − τ < 1 − 2τ and 1 − 2τ > 0, as
τ < 12 . Thus, we can fulfill the constraints by choosing sufficiently small constants  > 0 and η > 0 and an
m greater than a sufficiently large constant and setting R = 1− τ − .
– Using the folded RS codes provided by Theorem 5 in Construction 1, we can conclude that for every n > 0
there exist a prime power q = O(n) and an n-player Fq-linear secret sharing scheme LSSSC,h with τn-
privacy, σn-reconstruction, rate ρ, shares from Fmq and which is (τn, poly(n))-list reconstructible. Here,
we use a linear universal hash function h chosen from a family H of Fq-linear universal hash functions
which maps FRmnq to Fρmnq .
– Using the folded AG codes provided by Theorem 6 in Construction 1, we can conclude that there exists
a constant prime power q and an infinite family of Fq-linear secret sharing schemes {LSSSn}, such that
LSSSn is an n-player Fq-linear secret sharing scheme LSSSC,h with τn-privacy, σn-reconstruction, rate
ρ, shares from Fmq and which is (τn, poly(n))-list reconstructible. Here, we use a linear universal hash
function h chosen from a family H of Fq-linear universal hash functions which maps FRmnq to Fρmnq .
This concludes the proof.
Construction 3 Let LSSS1 be an n-player linear secret sharing scheme with secret space Flq, and say that it
has t-privacy and r-reconstructability, as well as (t, `)-list reconstructability. Let further AMD be a (qk, ql, δ)-
AMD code. We define the secret sharing scheme LSSS3, having message space Fkq and share spaces equal to
those of LSSS1, by the following sharing and reconstruction procedures:
Share(s):
z← AMD.Encode(s)
c← LSSS1.Share(z)
Output c = (c1, . . . cn)
RobustReconstruct(c˜):
L← LSSS1.ListReconstruct(c˜)
For z¯ ∈ L:
s¯← AMD.Decode(z¯)
If s¯ 6= ⊥
Output s¯
Output ⊥
Lemma 10. The scheme LSSS3 given above is a (t, `δ)-robust linear secret sharing scheme with t-privacy
and r-reconstructability.
As for efficiency, the running time of Share is equal to the sum of the running times of AMD.Encode and
LSSS1.Share; the running time of RobustReconstruct is equal to he sum of the running time of LSSS1.ListReconstruct
and ` times the running time of AMD.Decode.
Proof. The fact that LSSS3 has t-privacy and r-reconstruction follows immediately from the t-privacy and
r-reconstruction of LSSS1. We will now show that LSSS3 can correctly reconstruct a secret from n shares
where up to t are incorrect, except with probability at most `δ. Let c = LSSS3.Share(s) for some adversarially
chosen secret s. Assume the adversary A corrupts a set A of players, where |A| ≤ t. Thus the corrupted
share vector c˜ can be written as
c˜ = c + e,
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where e is an additive error with support A. Since A computes c˜A from cA, which is independent of z =
AMD.Encode(s) by the t-privacy of LSSS1, e is independent of z (given s). We will consider the error-
probability of RobustReconstruct, i.e. the probability that RobustReconstruct(c˜) outputs something different
from s.
Consider the list E = LSSS1.ListReconstruct(e). As the weight of e is at most t, it holds that 0 ∈ E and
L = LSSS1.ListReconstruct(c˜) = z + E,
and thus in particular that z ∈ L. Moreover, as the error e is independent of z, it also holds that E is
independent of z. Hence, it holds for each r ∈ E that r is independent of z. By the AMD property it thus
holds for each r ∈ E\{0} that
Pr[AMD.Decode(z + r) 6= ⊥] ≤ δ.
A union bound yields that
Pr[∃r ∈ E\{0} : AMD.Decode(z + r) 6= ⊥] ≤ `δ.
Doing a change of variable, namely setting z¯ = z + r, such that the quantification over r ∈ E\{0} becomes
a quantification over z¯ ∈ z + E\{0} = L\{z}, gives us
Pr[∃z¯ ∈ L\{z} : AMD.Decode(z¯) 6= ⊥] ≤ `δ.
Thus, every z¯ ∈ L\{z} will be rejected by AMD.Decode, except with probability `δ. Furthermore, z ∈ L will
be accepted. Therefore, we can conclude that LSSS3.RobustReconstruct(c˜) = s, except with probability `δ.
Consequently, LSSS3 is (t, `δ)-robust, which concludes the proof.
We will now state our main result for this section.
Theorem 7. For any τ < 12 , any τ < σ < 1 − τ , any ρ < σ − τ and any integer λ > 0 (the security
parameter), we have that:
– For every n > 0 there exists an efficient n-player (τn, 2−λ)-robust secret sharing scheme LSSS with τn-
privacy, σn-reconstructability and with rate ρ. The shares have size Θ(log(n) + λ/n) and the secret has
size Θ(n · log(n) + λ).
– There exists an infinite family {LSSSn} of efficient n-player (τn, 2−λ)-robust secret sharing schemes with
τn-privacy, σn-reconstructability and with rate ρ. The shares have size Θ(1 + λ/n) and the secret has
size Θ(n+ λ).
We emphasize that even for non-robust ramp schemes, the rate ρ cannot be bigger than σ − τ .
Proof. We shall instantiate Construction 3 with the list reconstructible secret sharing schemes provided by
Lemma 9 and the AMD code given by Lemma 7. Let LSSS be an n-player Fq-linear secret sharing scheme
(from one of the two families in Lemma 9) with τn-privacy, σn-reconstructability and (τn, poly(n))-list
reconstructability, shares in Fmq and rate ρ′ with ρ < ρ′ < σ − τ . Recall that both constructions in Lemma
9 allow us to choose the parameter m arbitrarily large.
Now, we consider a (qρ
′mn−2κ, qρ
′mn, δ′)-AMD code AMD, as provided by Lemma 7, with δ′ = (ρ′mn−
2κ+ 1)/qκ, where κ is to be determined later. By Theorem 7, this gives (τn, δ)-robustness for
δ ≤ poly(n) · δ′ ≤ poly(n)ρ
′mn
qκ
=
m · poly(n)
qκ
.
Setting κ = λ/ log(q) + log(m · poly(n)) gives δ ≤ 2−λ. Finally, the rate of the scheme is given by
ρ′mn− 2κ
mn
= ρ′ − 2 λ
mn log(q)
− 2 · log(poly(n))
mn
− 2 log(m)
mn
.
16
By choosing the parameter m large enough, i.e. m = Ω(1+λ/(n·log(q))), this becomes bigger than ρ. Finally,
for the first family provided in Lemma 9, such an LSSS exists for every length n and we have q = O(n).
Thus we can choose the parameter m as m = Θ(1 + λ/(n · log(n)) and the shares for this instantiation have
size m · log(q) = Θ(log(n) + λ/n), whereas the secret has size ρmn · log(q) = Θ(n · log(n) + λ). The second
family provided by Lemma 9 is an infinite family for a constant q. Thus, for this instantiation the shares
have size m · log(q) = Θ(1 + λ/n), whereas the secret has size ρmn · log(q) = Θ(n+ λ). This concludes the
proof.
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